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The combination of transition and globalization since the early 1990s has caused dramatic 
changes in supply chains globally.  This paper uses survey evidence from several Eastern 
European countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Russia) on how these 
forces affect the dairy sector.  In many countries dairy farms are small family farms. 
Investments by foreign companies in processing and retailing and the opening to international 
markets have introduced higher standards, leading, in turn, to extensive contracting and vertical 
coordination in the dairy chain. In countries close to the EU the restructuring of the dairy chain 
was mostly driven by investments in dairy processing, while in countries further from the EU, 
and less advanced in transition, retail investments are playing a more important role in driving 
change throughout the dairy chain. There have been significant efficiency gains, and the vertical 
coordination had positive effects on farm investments and productivity, especially since the late 
1990s.  Evidence suggests that small dairy farms have generally benefited from the vertical 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2004, five Eastern European countries were among the top ten destinations of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) by global retail chains: Russia, Slovenia, Croatia, Latvia, and Slovakia. 
Russia, for the second year in a row, received most FDI in retailing worldwide. Moreover, 
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic are not on the list because they are already “mature 
markets”, following massive investments a few years earlier.  Only a decade ago, all of these 
economies were just emerging from state control of food markets.  Moreover, the retail 
investments are just the latest foreign investment wave. 
The combined forces of “globalization” and “transition” have, in all these countries, 
caused dramatic changes in the agri-food supply chains in the past 15 years.  After vertically 
integrated supply chains collapsed in the early transition years with privatization and company 
restructuring, recently vertical coordination has increased again, due to a combination of factors, 
such as rising standards and major market imperfections (Gow and Swinnen, 1998; 2001).   
These changes had important effects on efficiency and equity (Swinnen, 2005). Important equity 
issues are  whether this process is excluding small farms or whether contracting with 
downstream companies leads to rent extraction of farmers by creating dependency.   
In this paper we draw on recent surveys in the dairy sectors of several countries to 
document the changes that have taken place and to identify the effects and the determinants of 
small farmer participation in restructured dairy supply chains.  The surveys were conducted in 
Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Poland and Albania, countries with very different levels of income, 
progress in transition reforms, and structure of dairy production (see table 3).  
 
2.  METHODOLOGY 
 
In the following sections we will present data that were collected in several countries 
using a unique multi-stage survey methodology.  In the first stage, interviews are conducted 
  3with firms downstream in the dairy supply chain (e.g. dairy processors and retailers). In all 
countries we selected dairy processors to provide a mix based on size and ownership 
(domestically or foreign owned; private or cooperative). In Poland we interviewed 6 dairy 
companies, in Bulgaria - 11, Russia - 5, Slovakia - 6, and in Albania 12.  In Poland and Russia, 
the interviews with dairy companies were complemented with interviews with retailers. In the 
second stage, information collected in the first stage is used to design a farm survey. 
This survey design is country-specific. The structure of the farm sector is very different 
in Poland (small-scale household farming) and Slovakia (large-scale farm companies) and this 
has implications for the selection of respondents in the survey. The second stage was conducted 
in Poland in 2001, in Bulgaria in 2003 and Albania in 2005. On average 300 farm households 
were randomly selected in each of these countries. The data from the farm survey allow to 
econometrically estimate the effect of investments and assistance programs of processors on 
small suppliers.   
Sometimes more stages were necessary.  For example, in Bulgaria we found that dairy 
processors were not contracting with farm households directly but rather with milk owners of 
collection stations. This meant that information needed to be gathered also on the level of the 
milk collection stations in order to answer the research question. 
 
 
3.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DAIRY IN EASTERN EUROPE 
 
Dairy is important sector in all countries. However, milk production declined strongly in 
the first years of transition (figure 1). The main reason was that their milk production was 
heavily subsidized under the communist regime. The cut in subsidies and the disruptions 
associated with the economic reforms caused a collapse in output and in the number of dairy 
  4cows.
1 Table 1 shows that in almost all Eastern European countries dairy cows declined with 
more than 40% and cow milk output went down by around 25%, except in Romania, Slovenia 
and Albania. Yields generally declined in the 1990s, but started increasing later and have grown 
robustly in most of the countries in recent years (see table 1 and figure 2). 
Eastern Europe has an interesting mix of dairy farms. In many countries, the dairy sector 
is mainly small-scale household production. In Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and 
Moldova more than 85% (and in most more than 95%) of all milk producers have less than 5 
cows. A high share of their production is used for self-consumption and the remainder is often 
sold to dairies through village collection points. This structure is changing only gradually. For 
example, between 1995 and 2000, farms with more than 5 cows increased by only 1.5% (from 
0.9% to 2.4%) in Albania and by only 2.6% in Poland.  Figure 3 illustrates the gradual change in 
farm structure on the basis of the Polish household survey.  
The dairy farm structure is completely different in Slovakia. The vast majority of milk 
comes from large-scale corporate farms. In 1999 only 10% of family farms had dairy cows and 
more than half produced milk for self-consumption.  On the other hand, 81% of the large 
corporate farms have dairy cows and 100% of this milk production is sold.   
  Also at the processing level transition caused large changes. Before transition, dairy 
processing was a state monopoly, but with processing facilities located in each major city. With 
privatization, restructuring, investments and increasing quality, consolidation is taking place. 
For example, in 1999 there were 570 dairy processors in Bulgaria. Their number strongly 
declined in the following years (to 404 in 2001 and 341 in 2004) due to the bankruptcy of small-
scale processors that did not survive the competition on the market.  There is a severe 
competition for milk supplies. The volumes supplied are much below the processors’ capacities. 
Because of this, processors have to collect milk even from small farms located sometimes more 
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1 Albania is an exception to this pattern, as the dramatic de-collectivization process there induced rapid growth in 
livestock output (see Cungu and Swinnen, 1999). than 150 km away. In 2004, about 20% of the processors had export licenses. They account for 
more than 62% of the collected and processed milk in the country (table 2).  
A similar evolution was observed in Poland.  The total number of dairy processing 
companies with more than 50 employees went down by 22% between 1993 and 1999. As in 
Bulgaria, the strongest decrease was in the cooperative processors, while the number of (non-
cooperatively owned) private companies doubled.  Yet, cooperatives still controlled 70% of the 
dairy market in 1999.  
In Albania there is a very different evolution. The number of processors increased from 
330 in 2000 to 379 in 2004 (Albanian Ministry of Agriculture and Food, 2004). However, a 
large part are traditional and half-mechanized small processing units (baxho) on the one hand 
and dairy plants with a processing capacity of 10-70 tons/day on the other, with no co-operative 
processors among them. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has played a crucial role in the restructuring process in 
Eastern Europe. FDI in the dairy sector has resulted from several company strategies: to serve 
the local market when trade constraints limit imports, to use the domestic economy advantages 
for exporting to the home market of the foreign company or to third markets, etc. The EU 
accession process further stimulated FDI because it reinforced the institutional and economic 
stability, the prospect of a large single market, growth in incomes and food demand, and - in 
some cases - expectations of EU subsidies (Walkenhorst, 2001; Dries and Swinnen, 2004). 
Poland has attracted significant FDI in the dairy sector in the mid 1990s, yet at the same 
time local companies continue to have a large share of the market. The liberalization of the 
Polish trade system and the privatization of the processing industry in the 1990s opened the 
Polish dairy sector to increased competition from abroad, allowed Polish exporters to search for 
new markets, and allowed foreign companies to invest in the Polish 
dairy sector, with major effects (Dries and Swinnen, 2004). 
  6In Slovakia, most foreign investments have taken place since 2000. This is late 
compared to Poland, where a major inflow of foreign investors in the sector occurred already in 
the mid 1990s (table 3). This is due to the political environment in the mid 1990s.  Slovakia was 
the only of the 10 CEE applicants for EU membership that failed to meet the political criteria for 
EU entry. After a regime change in 1999 created a more stable investment climate, FDI poured 
in. By 2003 77% of milk purchased in Slovakia was processed by foreign owned dairy 
companies (Agra Europe, April 2003).  Many of them are multinational companies: Sole, Italy; 
Meggle, Germany; Bongrain, Danone and Fromageries Bel, France; Artax, Austria; Friesland 
Coberco, Netherlands; and Amine Aour, Lebanon (table 4). 
  Also in Bulgaria and Albania FDI arrived relatively recent. Bulgarian had a severe 
economic crisis in the mid 1990s, constraining FDI inflow. In Albania, where FDI is still 
burdened with high transaction costs and administrative barriers, our survey found that in 2004 
Greek and Italian investors have entered the market aiming at the creation of new, middle- or 
large-scale processing facilities, following the intensive FDI inflow from 2002 (table 3). 
Russia is a mixed case. Foreign investments in the Russian dairy sector started in the mid 
1990s by Western European dairy producers (Hochland (1994), Danone (1995), but really 
picked up after 1998 (Ehrmann (1999), Campina (2000) and Onken (2003), Lactalis (2002) and 
Lacto (1998). In recent years, a strong competition in the dairy sector exists among the main 
foreign owned dairy processors operating there and the large domestic processors like Wimm 
Bill Dann. This is especially true for the regions of Moscow and St-Petersburg with 
considerable investments in the dairy sector.  
 
4.  THE DISRUPTION AND REORGANIZATION OF DAIRY SUPPLY CHAINS  
 
The simultaneous privatization and restructuring of farms, input suppliers, processors 
and retail companies caused major disruptions in the exchange relationships in the dairy chain 
  7during transition.  Widespread forms of contracting problems during transition were long 
payment delays or non-payments for delivered products. Such payment delays caused major 
drains on much needed cash flow for suppliers. An illustration is from the following quote: 
“Romanian farmers are holding back supplies of milk as they are experiencing considerable 
delays in being paid by processors and other buyers.  Many farmers have to wait more than two 
months to be paid for their milk.  Some started bringing milk into towns themselves as they will 
get their money immediate” (AgraFood East Europe, March 2003, p.23). This was a major 
problem for farms (Gow and Swinnen, 1998; Gorton et al., 2000). In addition, farms did not get 
access to credit and key inputs. Another problem was that dairy processors often had severe 
problems in obtaining sufficient quality supplies. Suppliers may not deliver the quality or 
quantity of raw milk agreed to. The problems are worsened by the lack of public institutions 
necessary to support market-based transactions, such as for enforcing property rights and 
contracts. As a result of these and other exchange disruptions, companies lacked reliable 
supplies of quality milk while farms faced serious constraints in accessing essential inputs (feed, 
capital, etc.) and in selling their products. 
In the absence of appropriate public institutions, private contractual initiatives have 
emerged to overcome these obstacles. A strategy to address these problems typically involved 
some form of vertical coordination. Successful vertical contracting has taken many forms, but 
has typically included conditions for product delivery and payments as well as farm assistance 
programs for suppliers. Dairy processing companies, often as part of their own restructuring, 
started contracting with the farms and provide inputs in return for guaranteed and quality 
supplies. Interviews with dairy companies suggest that one of the first actions new investors 
undertake as part of a company restructuring is to pay farmers on time. Farm assistance 
programs have taken many forms including, in some cases, input supply programs, investment 
  8assistance programs, trade credit, bank loan guarantee programs, extension and management 
advisory services, etc. 
 
Vertical Coordination (VC): Models and Enforcement 
 
Most of the contractual arrangements in the Eastern European dairy sector are between 
the processor and the farm. However, there are also more complex contracts. For example, 
triangular structures where processors and retailers work with banks, e.g. via loan guarantee 
programs, to reduce financial constraints of suppliers. We found examples of this in the dairy 
sector in many countries (see Box 1 and table 7). 
Another example of a triangular structure from Russia is the collaboration between the 
dairy processor Wimm Bill Dann (WBD) and the Swedish dairy equipment seller De Laval in 
the region of Nischnyj-Nowgorod (see Box 2). Practically all dairy farmers in the area have to 
modernize and upgrade their equipment and facilities, but only a few have the financial 
resources to do so.  The program allows dairy farms to lease milking equipment. They have to 
cover about 20% to 30% of the costs themselves and receive the equipment based on a three to 
five year leasing basis. The principal balance can be paid off by the farmers through delivering 
the raw milk to one of the dairy processors owned by WBD. The main condition in order to take 
part is the compliance with WBD quality standards. The equipment is being delivered by De 
Laval. The project costs are shared by WBD and De Laval.   
Two other interesting models are from Romania (Van Berkum 2004). First, Danone, an 
international food company, has developed an extensive finance scheme for dairy farms, 
including a triangular structure with input suppliers (see Box 3). But Danone goes further than 
most other companies as it takes collateral itself from farms for medium term investments for 
which it provides loans. Second, the Romanian dairy farmers association ISPA created a joint 
venture with a private milk processor ProMilch.  ISPA, with the assistance of a Dutch fund, 
provides loans to small farmers who want to invest in animals and/or equipment. Farmers do not 
  9have to provide any collateral; the milk delivered is considered the ‘collateral’. Eligibility 
criteria for loans include that the farmer needs to have a durable relation with ISPA, in practice a 
delivery period of at least 6 months but preferably 1 year. ISPA personnel, who have close 
contact with member farms, need to confirm the eligibility. Trust and reliability are also 
important. ISPA deals with the default risk by having a solidary liability of both the loan 
beneficiary and the milk collection center staff who guarantee for the reliability of the loanee.  
In summary, several of these institutional innovations are non-traditional mechanisms, 
developed to overcome specific constraints in transition economies.  Contracts and incentive 
structures have been designed to overcome working and investment capital constraints, a weak 
collateral base, information and enforcement problems, etc.  
The main engine behind these contracting models this is imitation and competition. Once 
one company introduces successful VC programs, either competitors copy these programs or 
suppliers shift to such processors. There is considerable evidence on this growth mechanism in 




Enforcement is crucial to make any of the contracts or supplier assistance programmes 
sustainable.  Enforcement is especially problematic in environments where public enforcement 
institutions are absent.  Evidence suggests that court enforcement of contracts is generally not 
efficient; even approaches based on collateral are often flawed because either farms cannot 
provide the necessary collateral, or collecting in on the collateral is problematic in many 
circumstances in transition. 
In such environments the best one can do is create “self-enforcing contracts” by 
designing the terms of the contracts such that nobody has an incentive to breach the contract 
(Gow and Swinnen, 2001).  This can be done by increasing the costs of breaching the contract 
  10or by introducing flexible terms which reduce the chance of breach in case conditions change 
unexpectedly.   
However, this is not a simple exercise. There are many stories of enforcement failure. 
For example, Gow and Swinnen (2001) report cases of an international dairy company in 
Romania which ended up canceling their input pre-finance program as farms continuously 
diverted the inputs for other uses. In other cases, foreign investors left after they failed to obtain 
sufficient quality of raw materials from their supplying farms, despite extension, training, and 
support programs, as suppliers regularly sold produce to other companies or traders.  
Even in the successful cases it took considerable fine-tuning of the contracts over time to 
make the contracts self-enforcing.  In addition, circumstances change so rapidly in transition 
that contracts required continuous adjustments as the self-enforcing range itself changes. 
Creating the right conditions for successful and self-enforcing contracting, requires extensive 
knowledge of the sector and of local conditions and an ability to flexibly adjust the contract 
terms to circumstances which can change rapidly in transition. 
Institutional innovations to ensure supplies for processors or payments for input 
suppliers also help to enforce contracts. Effectively, what companies do is interlinking markets. 
The enforcement of the credit transaction (loan and repayment) occurs through the output 
market.  Yet, whether this is sufficient as an enforcement mechanism depends on a variety of 
factors, and, as the evidence shows, it may not always be sufficient.  
Ultimately, the best way of solving the exchange, contracting, and collateral problems in 
transition countries is to base exchanges and contract enforcement on trust. Unfortunately due to 
traumatic experiences during both the communist and the transition periods, trust is generally 
lacking as a base for business exchanges in many transition countries.  However, empirical 
evidence does suggest that once companies are able to successfully instigate new contractual 
exchange forms that trust as a basis for business exchanges can develop relatively rapidly.  An 
  11interesting example of such trust-based lending to suppliers is the ISPA/Promilch project in 
Romania where a dairy company collaborates with a farmers association to provide loans to 
small farmers without collateral.  In general, the problem seems to be primarily to “get the thing 
going initially” and enforcement costs may decline over time.   
 
 
5.  DETERMINANTS OF RESTRUCTURING AND CONTRACTING 
 
In general, the emergence of VC and success of restructuring will depend on the level of 
reforms in a country, other characteristics which affect private sector investment, the 
functioning of the rural factor markets, and sector specific characteristics. We will review here a 
series of factors which have affected this process. 
 
The search for quality: public and private standards 
 
The shortage of supply of high quality milk, which was typical of early stages of 
transition induced vertical coordination and farm support packages. The demand for quality 
comes from public and private standards. On the public side, EU regulations and standards had a 
very important impact on the dairy chains in accession countries and countries trading with the 
EU. On the private side, modern processors and retail chains impose their private high standards 
even in countries where consumers may not demand such standards in Eastern Europe (Dries et 
al., 2004). There are several reasons for this. They use quality as a strategic tool and as an 
instrument to differentiate their products from competition. Another reason is that consistent 
quality standards reduce transaction costs in cross-border supply chains. Private standards also 
act as a substitute for missing public standards, infrastructure, and institutions.  
The relationship between public and private standards is nuanced.  In several cases 
public and private standards are complementary. For example, Van Berkum and Bijman (2004) 
find in their survey of food multinationals in Eastern Europe that these companies demand that 
  12their suppliers comply with both public and company specific quality standards. In order to 
reach the specific quality requirement levels, most of these companies have developed 
programmes to assist farmers to improve their production methods. 
 
The role of FDI 
 
An important issue is the role of foreign investment as an engine of change. An analysis 
of the Polish dairy sector (Dries and Swinnen, 2004) showed that FDI has been the most 
important driving factor behind dairy chain restructuring and VC programs. Foreign investment 
plays an important role as an initiator of change and institutional innovation.   
The introduction of basic forms of vertical integration requires access to outside 
financial sources, which foreign investors have, but which other investors also can have. 
However, more sophisticated forms of vertical integration, with a greater emphasis on quality 
and standards, are often introduced by foreign companies because they tend to pay greater 
attention to quality standards. 
However, spillover effects lead to convergence. In the Polish dairy sector in the mid 
1990s there was a significant difference between foreign owned processors and local processors. 
However by 2001 this gap had disappeared largely as domestic companies started copying the 
management practices of foreign affiliates.  
 
 
The impact of supermarkets versus processors 
 
Have (foreign owned) dairy processing companies or supermarket chains been the main 
drivers of change in the dairy sector? Our interviews with dairies and supermarket chains 
provide some evidence on this. First, supermarkets represent an important outlet for the dairy 
  13companies in Eastern Europe.
2 For example, table 5 shows that even in Bulgaria, where FDI in 
retailing started later than in Central Europe small and large dairy processors sell to (foreign 
owned) supermarket chains. All processors sign contracts if they are dealing with supermarket 
chains. Second, changing procurement systems by modern retail chains had a substantial impact 
on dairy processors. Interviews with dairy companies in Russia and Poland showed that dairies 
have substantially diversified their product range as a result of demands and opportunities at the 
retail level. Furthermore, dairy companies that used to be limited to selling their products locally 
are now increasingly finding nation-wide distribution possibilities through the retail sector. 
Apart from the opportunities, the retail sector imposes specific requirements in terms of 
commercial relations (contracts) as well as production, and post-production technologies. 
  However, the question remains whether supermarkets are also driving structural changes 
at the farm level. In order to shed some light on this issue, we look at the timing of market entry 
of foreign owned dairy processors (as was shown earlier, these have often acted as initiators of 
institutional change) and the multinationalisation of the supermarket sector. In Poland, the dairy 
sector also attracted foreign investors early on in the transition period: Unilever in 1991; Danone 
in 1992; Nutricia and Bongrain in 1993; Kraft, Hochland, Schöller and Land O’ Lakes in 1994; 
Yoplait and Hoogwegt in 1995.
3 Foreign investments in the retail sector on the other hand, 
peaked between 1995-1996 with major investments by chains like Ahold and Rewe. 
  Furthermore, we found no evidence during our interviews in Poland that the 
implementation of dairy assistance programs was directly linked to the increasing importance of 
                                                 
2 Retail chains also go through several steps in developing and upgrading their supply chains, going from wholesale 
markets to preferred supplies schemes and moving to distribution centre and cross-border supply systems. For 
example, one can distinguish two phases in the transformation of the ECA retail system, with different types of 
vertical relationships with supplying farms: an (early) “transition phase” when privatization and market 
liberalization took place; and a later “globalization phase” when major investments in the retail sector by 
multinationals take place. Countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are “first wave 
countries” in terms of retail transformation, starting the globalization period around 1996.  Some Balkan countries 
such as Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria are part of a second wave, where retail globalization started in the late 
1990s.  In a third wave of countries, including Russia and Ukraine, retail globalization did not really start until 
2002, but is growing very rapidly now (Reardon and Swinnen, 2004). 
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3 There was another wave of investments in the late 1990s and 2000. the supermarket sector. In general, the assistance programs were initiated in the first half of the 
1990s, while the major foreign supermarket chains entered the market later on. Rather, dairy 
processors frequently stated that upgrading their supplier base (through the use of assistance 
programs or strict quality policies) was guided by their wish to gain access to the EU market 
(i.e. to acquire an EU export license) or by the EU accession process more in general. This 
seems to be the general picture in the more advanced transition countries such as Polland, Czch 
Republic and Hungary.
4  
In Russia, which was not affected by EU accession and the associated integration of 
standards and markets, the picture is somewhat different and the supermarket sector is having a 
real impact throughout the dairy supply chain. Interviews with processing companies showed 
that supermarkets were putting cost and quality pressures on them, considerably beyond their 
non-supermarket outlets. This was particularly the case for the dairy systems outside of the main 
consumer markets (such as Moscow and St. Petersburg).  The spread of the major retail chains 
to the provinces happened before modern dairy investments.  In these regions, it is the retailers 
that are the frontrunners and who are driving the changes.  Metro, Ramenka and all the big local 
retailers have recently been investing heavily in major cities all over Russia.  The modern 
dairies, and especially foreign dairy investors, are still struggling to get their quality chains 
organized around Moscow where there is a strong competition to get the good milk suppliers.  
In summary, in countries close to the EU (either in terms of accession or in terms of 
trade), the restructuring of the dairy chain was mostly driven by investments in processing, 
while in countries further from the EU, and less advanced in transition, retail investments are 
playing a more important role in driving change throughout the dairy chain. That said, the 
growth of supermarkets is having a significant and growing effect also in Central Europe, not so 
                                                 
4 In Bulgaria, the first major foreign investment in the dairy sector was made by Danone in 1993. However, the rest 
of the dairy FDI came around the same time as retail FDI. Foreign-owned supermarkets arrived in 1999 with Metro. 
It was followed by Austrian, Turkish, Greek and other investments in the retail sector. 
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 much in terms of quality, but in terms of price and other demands being imposed on the 
upstream companies.  
 
Reform and restructuring 
 
The previous shows how dairy chain restructuring is affected by investments in 
processing, supermarkets and stages of transition. Obviously, all these factors are themselves 
affected by more fundamental changes, such as series of reforms that have influenced the 
investment climate, market imperfections, constraints, etc. all of which had an important impact 
on the dairy chain restructuring and investments.  
The absence of foreign or domestic investments typically reflects political or economic 
instability, insecure property rights, and the absence of key reforms.
5 An analysis of delayed 
FDI in Slovakia confirm that poor government policies are a major constraint for investments. 
More generally, this is illustrated by Figure 4 which shows a very strong positive correlation 
between reform progress in transition countries and investments by multinational retailers. 
The reform progress had also an important impact on contracting and VC as key reforms 
are needed to facilitate contract enforcement. This can be concluded from a comparison of farm 
assistance programs in countries at various reform stages. Tables 6 and 7 shows the forms of 
investment assistance being offered by dairy companies to their suppliers in each country in 
Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania based on a series of interviews in the four countries 
with quite different farm structures and at different stages of transition. 
In Poland, each of the dairies has an input supply programs in which they provide access 
to inputs such as feed (or seeds and fertilizers for on-farm feed production). Five out of six 
companies assist farm investment through credit programs. Most of the companies also provide 
extension services to their suppliers. Five of the dairies provide guarantees on bank loans made 
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5  See e.g. the 2005 World Bank report on “Improving the Investment Climate”. to farmers, most of which include preferential interest rates. Most also co-sign bank loans when 
farmers lack sufficient collateral.  
In Slovakia, all dairies assist farms through credit programs for dairy specific 
investments. Three of the six interviewed companies assist their suppliers in accessing inputs. 
Most of the companies also provide extension services. Three of the dairies provide guarantees 
on bank loans made to farmers. The respondents indicated that they offer these types of 
programs in order to upgrade milk quality and to secure their supplier base against loss to other 
dairies who do offer these valuable services.  
Even in Bulgaria, the country least advanced in reforms and transition and which 
displays the lowest degree of vertical coordination, most of the 11 interviewed dairies offer 
assistance to their suppliers. Nine companies assist farms through credit programs for dairy 
specific investments, with two of these indicating that they also offer credit for general 
investments. Ten of the selected dairies assist their suppliers in accessing inputs for on-farm 
feed production. The majority also provides extension services. Five out of the eleven 
companies offer bank loan guarantees. Securing the supply base is indicated as the main reason 
for offering these programs in almost all cases.  
The share of companies offering assistance has increased in all three countries. Dairy 
companies in Poland implemented assistance programs quickly. In Bulgaria, the number of 
dairy companies offering assistance increased gradually. In Slovakia, the increase in assistance 
accelerated after 1998, consequent with increased inflows of FDI. Programs initiated through 
the use of FDI may have forced local dairies to implement assistance programs in response to 
increased competition as well as providing examples for local dairies to emulate.  
  17Two countries, which are even less advanced, are Romania and Azerbaijan. Both are 
characterized by a small scale dairy farms and domination of street sales of milk.
6 However, 
since 2000 there have been major changes in Romania, where growing FDI has induced 
important changes. VC and contracting has developed rapidly with FDI. Interviews show that 
the large dairy companies contract with small and large farms and offer their farmers assistance 
programmes. Improving milk quality and securing the milk supply base are the major reasons 
behind offering these assistance programmes. Extension services include support to farmers 
from making feeding plans for their herd, how to increase milk quality, cleaning practices and 
also full business plans. Several dairies provide pre-financed inputs and medium-term 
investment credits. However, most dairies offer these services only to larger farms.  
No such change has occurred in Azerbaijan due to absence of FDI. Vertical linkages are 
almost non-existent in the dairy markets, and the local industry remains weak.
7 A particular 
problem of the Azeri production system is the lack of basic infrastructure such as reliable energy 
supplies. Regular electricity disruptions in rural areas prevent investments in basic mild cooling 
and processing equipment.  
To estimate the cross-country impact of reforms on VC, we compared the importance of 
VC, as measured by our surveys (see tables 6 and 7), and an index of reform progress estimated 
by EBRD. This relationship is in figure 5 which indicates a strong positive effect of the progress 
in economic reforms on farm assistance programs. 
In summary, these findings for the dairy sector support key hypotheses that (a) VC is 
growing in the ECA region, (b) that its emergence is strongly influenced by reform policies; (c) 
that VC starts first with input support, extension and simple credit programs. Later more 
                                                 
6 In Romania over 95% of all farms have 1-2 cows. Only 20-25% of the milk production is processed. Farm use and 
direct sales on street markets are the main outlets. The processing industry is very fragmented; there are around 550 
dairies of which 250 have a capacity of less than 1000 ton/year. The six largest dairy companies account for 25% of 
dairy processing. In Azerbaijan dairy farms are also small and less than 10% of the dairy products sold on the 
market are processed by the industry. Most of the products are sold directly from the farmer to the customer.  
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7 Similar can be observed in Albania where VC is also weak and no assistance from processors to suppliers is 
provided, apart from one case discovered from our survey. sophisticated programs, such as bank loan guarantees and investment loans are developed; (d) 
that VC is very important in the most advanced ECA countries and that less advanced ECA 
countries will converge to this. Evidence from other countries and sectors largely confirms this 
picture.  
 
6.  IMPACTS 
 
The impact of these contract innovations is difficult to quantify as several other factors 
affect output simultaneously and as company level information is difficult to obtain. Still, the 
evidence we collected from several surveys and a series of case studies suggests that successful 
private contract enforcement with vertical contracting has important positive effects, both direct 
and indirect.  
  19Payment delays : As a result of supply chain restructuring and vertical coordination, 
exchange and payment problems have been importantly diminished. Table 8 shows how 
payment delays affected more than one-third of the dairy farms in Bulgaria throughout the 
1990s, but have declined significantly in recent years. The average length of the payment delay 
has also declined and in 2004 is some 27 days, about 2.5 times less than during initial transition 
years. 
Supplies and productivity:  Farms have experienced beneficial effects on output, 
productivity and product quality through better access to inputs, timely payments, and improved 
productivity with new investments.  Relatively small changes in the industry’s practices can 
already have a major impact at the farm level. In 2001 the Dutch “Friesland” company bought a 
Romanian dairy, which utilised less than 50% of its capacity and had a bad reputation with 
respect to paying its farmers. Without changing anything but paying-in-time, Friesland 
succeeded in taking-in 20-30% more milk within a time period of 3 months. If farmers are 
convinced that a processor is reliable in making its milk payments, producers are generally 
prepared to deliver (more of) their milk (Van Berkum, 2004). 
In their survey of ECA agri-business enterprise executives, White & Gorton (2004) 
concluded that various contract support measures had caused an average increase in yields of 
9.6 %. The measures with the greatest impact on yields were specialist storage (especially 
cooling equipment in the dairy sector), veterinary support and physical inputs. Specialist storage 
in the form of on-farm cooling tanks has been particularly important in raising yields and quality 
in the dairy sector, an effect also found in other countries (Dries, 2004). Market measures such 
as prompt payments, guaranteed prices, and market access also had significant positive effects.  
Quality of output also improved due to these measures, as evidenced by increases in the 
percentage of output reaching higher or basic quality standards in response to specific programs. 
The programs with the greatest impact on quality were quality control support, veterinary 
  20support, physical inputs, market access and prompt payment programs. Firms that saw an 
increase in product quality procured a significantly greater proportion of agricultural raw 
materials using contracts and also employed a significantly greater number of contract support 
measures.  
Figures 6 shows how milk quality rose rapidly following contract innovations by dairy 
processors that were introduced in Poland in the mid 1990s, in Bulgaria at the end of 1990s and 
in Russia in 2000. In Poland, the share of the market held by highest quality milk increased from 
less than 30% on average in 1996 to around 80% on average in 2001. In Bulgaria, extra quality 
milk increases from 17% on average in 1997 to 34% in 2003 combined with decline in the 
average shares of the lowest quality milk, from 20% in 1997 to 10% in 2003. In the Russian 
Campina factory, the share of the highest quality milk increased from 6% in 2000 to 55% in 
2004, while the lowest quality fell from 37% to less than 10% over the same period.  
Investments and access to credit: Direct loans and loan guarantee programs 
contributed strongly to farm investments in small and medium dairy farms in North Poland 
(Dries and Swinnen, 2004). More than three quarters (76%) of all farms made investments in the 
past years after vertical coordination was implemented, including many small farmers. Of those 
who invested, 58% used loans for investments in enlarging and upgrading the livestock herd 
(30%) and cooling tanks (56%). Also, programs which assist farms in accessing inputs (mainly 
feed) enhance investment indirectly by lowering input costs, or reducing transaction costs in 
accessing inputs, and consequently, through improved profitability. Figure 7 illustrates the 
strong impact on investment in equipment, in particular cooling tanks, for small dairy suppliers.  
 
 
7.  (SMALL) FARMERS IN THE CHAIN 
 
 
A key concern is that this process of vertical coordination will exclude a large share of 
farmers, and in particular small farmers (e.g. Reardon and Berdegue, 2002). There are three 
  21important reasons for this. First, there is an important fixed transaction cost component in costs 
of exchanges between farms and companies, making it more costly for companies to deal with 
many small farmers than with a few larger suppliers. Second, another reason, is when some 
amount of investment is needed. Small farms are often more constrained in their financial means 
for making necessary investments, either because they do not have sufficient own resources or 
because they have problems accessing external funds in imperfect rural financial markets. Third, 
small farms typically require more assistance from the company per unit of output, because they 
may lack essential management capacity or investments. For example, before the vertical 
integration process started, large dairy farms in Slovakia had cooling tanks and dairy specialists, 
while small Polish dairy farms had neither.  
However, what empirical evidence do we have on the exclusion of small farms? Our 
surveys and interviews with companies generally confirm the main hypotheses that transaction 
costs and investment constraints are a serious consideration. Companies express a preference for 
working with relatively fewer, larger, and modern suppliers. However, our empirical 
observations also show a very mixed picture of actual contracting, with much more small farms 
being contracted than predicted based on the arguments above.  
Companies in reality work with surprisingly large numbers of suppliers and of 
surprisingly small size. Even studies pointing at challenges facing small farmers in evolving 
modern supply chains find that small and medium farmers can be successfully integrated in the 
chains, with processing and trading companies actively investing in institutions and 
infrastructure to reduce transaction costs, such as collection centers. For example, Friesland 
Romania, a subsidiary of the Dutch FCDF group, entered the Romanian market in 2000, and 
three years later had 5 factories. The company purchases milk from approximately 40,000 small 
farmers through 1,050 collecting points and from some 600 larger farms (van Berkum, 2004). 
  22Friesland owns the collection points and upgraded them by investing in cooling and inspection 
facilities. 
In Poland, we found that VC and increased quality requirements had positively affected 
the survival and growth of small dairy farms. 283 households in the sample delivered milk to 
dairy processing companies in 1995. Of these, only 36 (13%) stopped delivering milk between 
1995 and 2000. Ten of them (4%) stopped producing altogether while the rest kept some cows 
for home consumption.
8 Hence, 87% continued delivering to dairies despite radical restructuring 
of the dairies and tightened quality demands.  
Also White and Gorton (2005) find no evidence that small farmers have been excluded 
over the past six years in developing supply chains in five countries (Armenia, Georgia, 
Moldova, Russia and Ukraine). In the vast majority of cases companies have the same or 
smaller farmers in 2003 than in 1997. In fact, 57% of the processors have more small suppliers 
in 2003 than in 1997. Moreover, the processing companies indicate, on average, that they are 
not likely to cut suppliers in the future.
9
Often, supplier programs differ to address characteristics of varying farms. For example, 
in case studies of dairy processors in Moldova, Poland and Romania, we find that investment 
support for larger farms include leasing arrangements for on-farm equipment, while assistance 
programs for smaller dairy farms include investments in collection units with 
micro-refrigeration units. 
More sophisticated supplier assistance programs tend to be more available for larger 
farms. In Slovakia, three out of six interviewed companies said that farms need to have a 
minimum size to qualify for investment support; one indicated that only the bigger and better 
quality suppliers were allowed to use the (forward) credit program. In Bulgaria, five domestic 
                                                 
8 Most of those who stopped delivering probably would have stopped anyhow: the average age of those who 
stopped producing is 56 years, compared to 45 years for the entire sample. 
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9 Interestingly, for those that expect to deal with less suppliers in the future, this expectation is based mostly on 
choices made by farmers themselves who may move out of small-scale agriculture and into more rewarding 
activities either inside or outside agriculture as the economy is improving. dairies indicate that they set a minimum size for farms to qualify for their programs. Danone 
explicitly limits assistance programs to contracted suppliers. Meggle’s programs are limited to 
large suppliers by default since only farmers with large milk quantities can deliver to Meggle.  
Also White and Gorton (2005) find evidence that better and more assistance seems to go 
to larger farms, although there is significant variation with the type of assistance.
10 For example, 
there is little difference in the provision of quality control, guaranteed prices, agronomic 
support, prompt payments, or even farm loan guarantees between small and large suppliers. 
However, the majority of companies operate a minimum supplier size for providing credit, 
physical inputs, machinery etc.  
 
Why contracting with small farmers? 
 
Hence, despite the apparent disadvantages noted earlier, the empirical evidence suggests 
that vertical coordination with small farmers is widespread. The question is why? There are 
several reasons. 
First, the most straightforward reason is that companies have no choice. In some cases, 
small farmers represent the vast majority of the potential supply base.  For example, over 95% 
of dairy “farms” in Albania, Bulgaria and Romania have less than 5 cows. Hence any dairy 
processor needs to deal with small farms by necessity, focusing for example on investments in 
collection points etc. rather than on-farm equipment. 
Second, processors may prefer to deal with large farms because of lower transaction 
costs in e.g. collection and administration, but contract enforcement may be more problematic, 
and hence costly, with larger farms. In several interviews company managers indicated that 
(smaller) family farms were less likely to breach contracts or to divert company investments 
than large co-operatives or farming companies. Therefore, processors may prefer a mix of 
suppliers. 
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10 They define “small farm” as having less than 5 cows (in dairy) or operating less than 1 hectare. Third, small farms may have cost advantages in labor intensive, high maintenance, 
production activities such as dairy.  
Fourth, processing companies differ in their willingness to work with small farms. Some 
processing companies work with small suppliers even if others do not – this may reflect the 
companies’ roots as cooperative organizations. For example in the Romanian dairy sector, 
Friesland, and especially ISPA and Raraul seem to be more inclined to work with small farms 
than Danone, reflected in the way they assist small suppliers and invest in overcoming 
transaction costs (see table 9). All of them contract many small farms. Friesland has invested 
significantly in collection centers. Raraul and Promilch/ISPA take care of the collection and 
transport themselves. ISPA, a dairy association, further provides basic farm support (feeding, 
milk quality and hygiene). This example shows that small-scale farmers may have future 
perspectives when effectively organised. 
That said, even companies willing to invest in upgrading small farms only go so far, and 
tend to have a strategy in the long run to upgrade part of their supply here to larger, more 
efficient, and fewer suppliers. Yet, in countries like Poland, Romania, and many CIS countries 
dominated by household dairy production, “large” is a relative concept. As Van Berkum (2004) 
puts it: “In Romania, large farms are farms with more than five cows”. 
 
The Farm Assistance Paradox 
 
The evidence presented so far suggests an interesting paradox. Small farmers in ECA 
may not be able to make the necessary upgrades to satisfy the demand of modern supply chains 
without support packages by processors or agribusiness. If there are sufficient (quality) supplies 
available for processors, they have no interest in introducing such VC support packages. If there 
are not sufficient supplies, VC will be forthcoming. Hence, we have the paradoxical situation 
that small poor farms may be best off (in the perspective of “supply chain driven development”) 
if they are in an environment which is dominated by small financially constrained farms.  
  25There is some empirical evidence for this hypothesis. Companies seem to be most likely 
to reach out to small farms when they face a supplier base which is dominated by small farmers 
not able to supply the commodities they want, and least likely when there is a heterogeneous 
farm structure with some farms able to deliver the desired supplies. For example, some 
international dairy companies and foreign investors target larger farms as their preferred 
suppliers and only reach out to smaller suppliers if they need them to secure supplies. For 
example, in the case of dairy processors, the same processors have different minimum size 
thresholds for different countries, reflecting the structure of the farm sector in these countries. 
An international comparison suggests that in Hungary, with many medium and large farms, 
suppliers have to have more than 20 cows; in Poland, with many small farms, more than 5 cows, 
and in Romania, where almost the entire herd is in semi-subsistence farms, processors work 
with farms with 2 cows.  
 
Vertical Integration and Rent Distribution 
 
Another potential equity problems with the vertical coordination process is the 
possibility of rent extraction by the processor or the retailer. By introducing an interlinked 
contract, farms can access credit, inputs, etc. which was unavailable before and processing 
companies can have access to higher quality and timely supplies. Productivity and income 
increase for the chain as a whole. However, a key question is who benefits from this increase in 
efficiency and total income? If both the farm and the processor benefit from the institutional 
innovation, everybody is better off.  
However, the very rationale for the emergence of these vertical coordination institutions 
may at the same time act as a barrier to entry for other companies and may give the dominant 
partner in a transaction additional leverage. If the processing firm can set the terms of the 
contract such that it captures most or all of the rents, the productivity growth may not benefit the 
  26farms. Moreover, if the interlinking of transactions bestows additional monopoly power upon 
the processing company, the farm’s income could even be lower after the contract innovations, 
despite the fact that total income has improved.
11   
Hence, an important issue is how to combine efficiency gains with an equitable 
distribution of the benefits in the chain. Competition an important role in this process. 
Competition prevents companies from exercising monopoly power in the design of the contract 
conditions and makes it more likely that the farms share in the benefits.  
Empirical evidence on these issues is limited and one should be careful drawing 
conclusions. Preliminary evidence from the dairy chains suggests that so far in Eastern Europe 
both farms and processors benefit from private-sector-induced vertical coordination, and that 
there is substantial competition among dairy processors.
12  
The main reason is that the collapse of farm output and livestock numbers created a gap 
between processing capacity and supply, and hence excess demand. There is even more excess 
demand for high/better quality supplies because quality is low due to (a) a history of poor 
quality in the system and (b) reduced access to inputs and finance affect the quality as well. 
This makes Eastern Europe a “suppliers market” and this, in turn, supports the farms’ 
bargaining position vis-à-vis the processing sector in the distribution of supply chain rents.
13 
Moreover, in cases where quality supplies are scarce and non-trivial investment is required for 
                                                 
11 See Bardhan (1989) and Bell (1989) for an analysis of these equity effects in developing countries in the 
framework of landlord-tenant transactions.   
12 Rent extraction seems most problematic where governments are directly or indirectly involved in restricting 
competition, as e.g. in some Central Asian cotton chains (Swinnen, 2005).   
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13  Codron et al (2004) argue that also in Morocco and Turkey, where there is also a shortage of preferred suppliers 
to retail chains, these suppliers have strong bargaining power (“most of them have more bargaining power than the 
retailer”) because, first, as modern retailing of FFV is still in its infancy, there are only a few modern and large 
grower-shippers, and, second, with a high price gap between exported produce and local produce, the cost of 
contract termination for the suppliers is small since they can get the high export price for their high quality 
products. quality upgrading, the bargaining power of quality suppliers may increase substantially (post 
investment) vis-à-vis the processor or trader.
14  
These arguments are important both for the issue of exclusion and for the rent 
distribution in the chain because it suggests that the “power relationship” (and the rent 
distribution) is endogenous in the development of the supply chain integration. 
However, if competition among suppliers increases, or if demand falls, pressure on 
processors may lead to a consolidation of the supplier base. At this point there is no systematic 
evidence that this is happening in ECA. However, there is some ad hoc information from the 
most advanced countries, which suggest that this may be starting. Studies from other parts of the 
world, in particular emerging markets in Latin America, suggest that these pressures may be real 
and important (Reardon and Berdegué, 2002, Berdegué et al. 2003).  
 
8.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The transition process in Eastern Europe has caused tremendous restructurings of the 
dairy chains. Farms and companies were privatized. In many countries this resulted in a 
fragmentation of the dairy farms, with dairy now being produced on small family farms.  
At the same time, the dairy sectors were confronted with global markets and investments 
by foreign companies in processing and retailing. These investments and opening to 
international markets have introduced higher standards, leading, in turn, to extensive contracting 
and vertical coordination in the dairy chain. The evidence in this paper indicates that there have 
been large efficiency gains throughout the chain as a result, especially since the late 1990s.  
In countries close to the EU the restructuring of the dairy chain was mostly driven by 
investments in dairy processing, while in countries further from the EU, and less advanced in 
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14  Studies on international FFV supply chains in East Africa also find that with increasing demand for traceability, 
the “dependency relationship” between suppliers and processors changes; as processors/traders are now more 
dependent on their suppliers. By working with fewer suppliers, but with higher quality and traceability contracts, 
the suppliers become more “powerful” – and tend to get higher prices.  transition, retail investments are playing a more important role in driving change throughout the 
dairy chain.  
There important equity issues.  So far survey evidence suggests that the impact on small 
farms has been quite positive.  Future impacts will be nuanced.  First, the impact differs 
significantly between countries. The timing and extend of retail and processing investment 
differs strongly, reflecting country differences in economic reforms and government policies. 
Also, while in many Eastern countries small farms dominate, e.g. in Slovakia, in others dairy 
output is still mostly produced by large corporate farms. 
Second, the impact of VC is likely to be a continuation of important chain restructuring 
which started fifteen years ago. Besides privatization, this included a massive outflow of labor. 
In countries, such as Estonia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, more than 50% of 
(officially registered) workers left agriculture early on in transition.
15 This process continued as 
investments in the food industry and the need to enhance the international competitiveness of 
the domestic farms have continued pressure for restructuring. In other countries this adjustment 
process has been delayed by a variety of problems, but has started since 2000 and a significant 
reduction in agricultural employment will be necessary with economic growth, with or without 
VC and supermarkets.  
Third, the VC has positive effects by addressing major weaknesses of the dairy farms. 
The sector is in need of finance for investments, technology and quality improvements, and 
access to high value markets. All these factors weaken the competitiveness of supply chains. 
Investments by modern processing companies and vertical coordination with suppliers can play 
a significant role in addressing these weaknesses and improving the global competitiveness of 
the supply chains. Moreover, instead of excluding small farms, private supplier assistance 
schemes seem to reach many small farms which are left out of government programs. For 
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15 The average annual decline in agricultural employment in the first wave countries Hungary, Czech Republic and 
Poland was -12% in 1989-1992, -6% in 1993-1997, and -4% in 1998-2001 (Swinnen et al., 2005). example, recent World Bank studies on the Lithuanian and Slovakian dairy sectors show that 
small farms do not get access to government programs or EU support such as SAPARD. For 
them, the only source of credit and finance is supplier credit from restructured dairy processors. 
Fourth, modern retail and dairy company investments will not only affect farms, but will 
have a wider impact on rural development. This includes improved access to better quality and a 
wider variety of foods and other products for rural households, and the creation of off-farm 
employment, directly or indirectly, in the supply chain. Investments in processing, quality 
control, extension services etc. are likely to create new jobs in the rural areas; while at the same 
time the competition from the new chains will cause traditional shops and processors to close. 
Modern retail and dairy companies, as motors of market development, will also generate 
opportunities for differentiation of products and value added.  
In summary, these arguments suggest that modern supply chains have the potential for 
important positive implications for rural households in Eastern Europe, despite the challenges 
that they pose. These investments may bring very significant benefits to the region, but could 
also pose significant threats where inefficient or undercapitalized farmers cannot “make the 
grade.” It is important for policy to focus on the most effective and appropriate methods for 
developing “win-win” solutions for companies and farmers.  
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 Figure 1. Change in cow milk output in selected CEE countries, %, 1984-88=100* 















Source: Author’s calculations based on FAOSTAT data 
 
 
Figure 2. Change in cow milk yields in selected CEE countries,  %, 1984-88=100* 


















Source: Authors’ calculations based on FAOSTAT data 
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Note: * Each data point gives the average frequency of farms in three consecutive size classes of which the data 
point itself is the size class in the middle. For example, the data point for herd size three signifies the average 
number of farms with herd sizes 2, 3 and 4. 
Source: Dries and Swinnen, 2004 
 
















































Note: * Correlation (R
2) is 0.79. Data include Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine 
Source: Dries, Reardon and Swinnen, 2004 


















































* Data include observations from Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia 
Source: Dries and Swinnen (2005) 
 
  36Figure 6. Change in milk quality in Eastern Europe  
 





















































































Note: *Average share in total milk supply; ** Milk deliveries to the Campina factory in Stupino. 
Source: Authors’ survey results for Poland and Bulgaria; EBRD/FAO (2004) for Russia. 
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Figure 7. Growth in dairy farm investments in Poland 1995-2003 (% of suppliers with own cooling tanks for 







































































Source: Dries (2004) 
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Table 1. Main dairy indicators in selected CEE countries, 1984/88-2003 
# dairy cows  Milk output  Milk yields 
Country  (' 000 heads)  (' 000 tons)  (tons/year) 
   1984-88 2003 
% 







Albania    245.1 435.0 77.5 321.0 895.0  178.8 1.31  2.06  57.3 
Bulgaria    639.7 410.0 -35.9  2160.2  1188.8  -45.0 3.37 2.9 -13.9 
Czech R.**  874.1  459.6 -47.4  3453.8  2645.7 -23.4 3.95 5.76  45.8 
Slovakia** 386.0  220.5  -42.9  1250.0  1142.2  -8.6  3.24  5.18  59.9 
Hungary   587.7  332.0  -43.5  2792.1  2100.0  -24.8  4.76  6.33  33.0 
Poland   5226.5  2750.0  -47.4  16020.9  11803.7  -26.3  3.07  4.29  39.7 
Romania    1926.3 1694.6  -12.0 3902.9 4852.2  24.3  2.03 2.86  40.9 
Slovenia*  220.0 130.7 -40.6 580.8 700.0 20.5 2.64  5.36 103.0 
Russia*  20192.2 11218.3  -44.4 47015.0 33085.3  -29.6  2.32  2.95  27.2 
FSU  42925.0 27356.5  -36.3  101422.6 67395.1  -33.6  2.36  2.46  4.2 
Eastern 
Europe 13056.3  7810.4  -40.2  36766.2  28505.9  -22.5  2.82  3.65  29.4 
Notes: * 1984-88= 1992; ** 1984-88 = 1993 




Table 2. Structure of the Bulgarian dairy processing industry according the export orientation of the 
processors in 2003-2004 
2003 2004 
Type of license 
# 
Processors 















Export  to  EU  16 4.6 15.3 28 8.2 35.7 
Export to other countries  46  13.1  42.1  41  12.0  26.8 
Only domestic sales  288  82.3  42.6  272  79.8  37.5 
Total 350  100.0  100.0  341  100.0  100.0 




Table 3. FDI and Retailing in Eastern Europe  

























Poland 3.5  11.0  family  farm  15-30  1994-1995  10  1995-1996 
Slovakia  3.3  340.0  corporate  62  since 2000  10  since 2000 
Bulgaria 3.3  1.6  family  farm  5  since  1999  6  1999-2001 
Russia 2.9  2-15
b mixed  < 10  since 1998  <5  since 2001 
Albania 2.6  2.0  family  farm  5
a 2002 0  --- 
Note: * EBRD Reform index: data for 2002; 
a The dairy industry in Albania processes about 20% of total milk 
produced in the country. 
b Half of the milk is produced by households, which size according to official sources is in 
the range of 2-15 cows. Corporate farms, however, operate on much larger scale (200-1000 cows);  
Source: EBRD (2003) for the EBRD Reform Index, Authors’ survey results for the dairy indicators and FDI; 
USDA (2003), Dries et al (2004) and authors’ estimates for FDI shares. 
39Table 4. Structure of the Slovakian dairy processing sector, 2003  
Company Name  Location  Majority owner  FDI since  Market share* 
Mliekospol, a.s.  Nové Zamky  95% Sole, Italy  2002  8% 
Tamilk, a.s.  Trnava  100% Sole, Italy  2001  4% 
Sole Slovakia, a.s.  Bratislava  99% Sole, Italy  2001  4% 
Rajo, a.s.  Bratislava  51% Meggle, Germany  1993  13% 
Liptovska Mliekaren, a.s.  Liptovsky Mikulas  97% Bongrain, France  2000  6% 
Zvolenska Mliekaren, a.s.  Zvolen  100% Bongrain, France  2001  4% 
Milex Nové Mesto nad Vahom, a.s.  Nové mesto nad Vahom  51% Co-operative (49% Bongrain, France)  2001  4% 
Zempmilk, a.s.  Michalovce  91% Fromageries Bel, France  2000  7% 
Prievidzska Mliekaren, a.s.  Prievidza  95% Artax, Austria  2000  4% 
Milsy, a.s.  Banovce nad Bebravou  95% Artax, Austria  2001  4% 
Nutricia Dairy, s.r.o.  Nitra  100% Friesland, Netherlands  2000  4% 
Laktis, a.s.  Zilina  (9% Friesland, Netherlands)  2002  5% 
Milex Galanta, a.s.  Galanta  100% Amine Aour Middle Foods, Lebanon  2002  3% 
Danone, s.r.o.  Modranka Trnava  100% Danone, France  2000  1% 
Senicka Mliekaren, a.s.  Senica  67% Co-operative    4% 
Levicka Mliekaren, a.s.  Levice  Domestic    4% 
Milkagro, s.r.o.  Presov  Domestic    4% 
AGW Milk, a.s.  Trebisov  Domestic    3% 
Humenska Mliekaren, a.s.  Humenné  Domestic    4% 
Gemerska Mliekaren, s.r.o.  Rimavska Sobota  Domestic    1% 
Tatranska Mliekaren, a.s.  Kezmarok  Domestic    2% 
Tvrdosinska Mliekarin, s.r.o. 
 
Tvrdosin  ???    4% 
Other         3%
* Estimate 
Note: a.s. = corporation; s.r.o. = Limited Liability Company 




Table 5. Bulgaria: Distribution channels of the interviewed dairy processors in 2003 
Distribution channels 
Export  Company Name  BG 
supermarkets 
FDI 
supermarkets  Wholesalers     
 
Own  shops Other
EU Other
Contracts with 
supermarkets  HACCP certified 
Large-scale ( > 60 mio ltr.)                 
Serdika 90  Y (2000) 
 
N  Y  Y  N  N  Y  Y  Y (2003) 
  Markelli               
                 
              
             
            
              
Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N
Danone Y Y Y N N N N Y N
Middle-scale ( 15-60 mio ltr.) 






N  N  Y  Y  Y  Y (2002) 
Mlekimex Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y  (2002)
Fama  Y (1995)  Y (1997)  Y  N  N  N  Y  Y  In process  
Iotovi  Y (1995) 
 
N  Y (1999) 
 
N  N  N  Y  Y  Y (2001) 
  Merone Y N Y N N N Y Y
Small-scale (< 15 mio ltr.) 
PRL  Y (2002)  Y (2003)  Y  N  N  N  N  Y  In process 
Mandra Obnova  Y (2001)  Y (2003)  Y (1998)  Y (1998)  N  N  N  Y  In process 
Milky World  Y  N  Y  N  N  N  N  N  N 
Source: Authors’ survey results 
 
 Table 6. Farm assistance programs offered by dairy companies 












Poland**             
Mlekpol  Y    Y  Y  N  Y 
Mleczarnia  N    Y  N  N  Y 
Kurpie  Y    Y  Y  N  Y 
Mazowsze  Y    Y  Y  N  N 
ICC Paslek  Y    Y  Y  N  Y 
Warmia Dairy  Y    Y  Y  Y  Y 
Bulgaria 
Merone  Y(2000)  N  Y(n.a.)  Y(1992)  N  N 
Fama  Y(1994)  N  Y(1994)  N  N  Y(once) 
Mlekimex  Y(1997)  Y(1998)  Y(1997)  Y(1999)  Y(1997  Y(1998) 
Danone  Y(1997)  N  Y(1998)  Y(2000)  Y(1995)  Y(1999) 
Iotovi  N  N  Y(1995)  N  N  Y(1995) 
Milky World  Y(1999)  Y(2000)  Y(1999)  Y(1999)  N  Y(1999) 
Markelli  Y(1999)  N  Y(1998)  N  N  N 
Mandra Obnova  Y(1998)  N  Y(2000)  Y(2000)  N  N 
Meggle  Y(2001)  N  Y(2001)  Y(2001)  N  N 
PRL  N  N  N  Y(2002)  N  N 
Serdika 90  Y(1997)  N  Y(1997)  Y(1997)  N  N 
Slovakia 
Liptovska  Y(2000)  N  N  Y(1994)  N  N 
Mliekospol  Y(1999)  N  N  Y(1992)  Y(1992)  Y(1992) 
Rajo  Y(2001)  N  Y/N  Y(1992)  N  N 
Levicka  Y(1998)  N  Y(1998)  Y(0000)  N  Y(1998) 
Tatranska  Y(2001)  N  Y(2000)  Y(0000)  N  N 
Nutricia Dairy  Y(2000)  N  N  N  N  Y(2000) 
Romania 
Danone  Y    Y  Y    Y 
Friesland  Y    Y  Y    Y 
Promilch  Y    Y  Y    Y 
Raraul  N    Y  Y    N 
*Either the company provides inputs and the farmer pays back later, or the company offers forward credit, 
which the farmer uses to buy inputs. 
** In Poland no distinction is made between credit for dairy-specific investments and general investments. 
Farm-level evidence shows that the dairy companies mainly support dairy-specific investments 
Source: Dries and Swinnen (2004) and Van Berkum (2004) 
  42Table 7. Share of interviewed dairy companies having assistance programs, in % 
            
   Credit  Inputs  Extension  Veterinary  Bank Total 
            
            
  PL  50 67 50  0  50 43 
1994  SK  0  0 83  17  17 23 
  BG  9  18 9  0  0 7 
            
  PL  83  100 83  17  83 73 
1998  SK  17 17 83  17  33 33 
  BG  45 64 18  18  18 33 
            
  PL  83  100 83  17  83 73 
2002  SK  100 33 83  17  50 57 
  BG  82 91 73  18  36 60 
            
Source: Authors’ survey results 
 
 
Table 8. Structure and duration of the payment delays in the Bulgarian dairy sector, 1994-2003 
Year  Farms with Payment Delay 
(% of all delivering farms) 
Average length of the Payment Delay* 
(days) 
1994 33.6  75 
1995 35.9  79 
1996 34.9  81 
1997 38.2  75 
1998 37.1  69 
1999 33.8  65 
2000 27.6  71 
2001 22.4  61 
2002 15.9  48 
2003 10.5  27 
Note: * Farms that have never been paid for delivered milk are excluded from the estimation. 





Table 9. Contracts partners and arrangements for collection and transport in Romanian dairy 
Arrangement Danone  Friesland Promilch/ISPA Raraul 
Contracting small farmers  X  X  X  X 
Contracting large farmers  X  X    X 
Owning collection centres    X  X  X 
Arranging transport farm- collection centre      X  X 
Arranging transport collection centre-dairy      X  X 
Note: X means ‘yes’ or ‘applicable to’ 
Source: Van Berkum (2004) 
  43Box 1: Triangular structure 













Box 2: Leasing of dairy equipment by joint leasing project  






















Box 3: Dairy Processors as Financial Institutions 
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